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Abstract
To encourage private actions for damages in antitrust cases some ju-
risdictions subtract a fraction of the redress from the fine. We analyze
the effectiveness of this policy. Such a rebate does not encourage set-
tlement negotiations that would otherwise not occur. If, however, the
parties settle without the rebate, the introduction of the reduction
increases the settlement amount, yet at the price of reduced deter-
rence for those wrongdoers who are actually fined. Under a leniency
program the rebate does not affect the leniency applicant: she doesn’t
pay a fine that can be reduced. The overall effect of a fine reduction
on deterrence is, therefore, negative.
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Antitrust rules are enforced publicly by competition agencies, typically by
way of fines. Moreover, they can be enforced privately by the victims of an
infringement through damage actions. In quite a few jurisdictions there is
concern about the underdevelopment of private antitrust enforcement. For
example, while in the US private cases already amount to at least 90% of
antitrust enforcement, in the EU no more than 10% of antitrust enforcement
was private.1 During the period 2006-2012 less than 25% of the Commission’s
infringement decisions were followed by private damages actions. Cases were
mostly brought in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, while
no follow-on actions were reported in 20 out of 28 member states.2
Several factors contribute to this underdevelopment: Typically, jurisdic-
tions in Europe do not allow for collective actions and do not award punitive
damages. Furthermore, the plaintiff in a civil suit does not have the means
of an antitrust authority like dawn raids etc. to prove the infringement.3
Finally, the plaintiff assumes substantial expense risk, in particular if the
English cost allocation rule applies and contingency fees are not allowed.
To encourage private antitrust enforcement the EU adopted Directive
2014/104/EU in 2014. The Directive establishes the right of victims to obtain
full compensation for the harm caused by an anti competitive conduct. Full
compensation includes actual losses and loss of profit, plus interest from
the time the harm occurred until compensation is paid. In order to ensure
that the right to full compensation is effectively guaranteed, the Directive
introduces a number of measures which should facilitate antitrust damages
claims in EU Member States.4
One measure that has been put forward lately is to subtract part of
1EU (2006).
2OECD (2015).
3The burden of proof is, however, lower in a civil than in an administrative suit.
4For details about the measures, see, e.g., OECD (2015).
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the redress paid to the victims from the fine. For example, in its deci-
sions Strassenbau and Engadin II (3.9.2019), the Swiss Competition Com-
mission subtracted half of the settlement payment paid by the bid rigging
construction companies to the victim (the Canton of Graubünden) from the
wrongdoers’ fines.5 Likewise, in June 2014 the Israeli Antitrust Tribunal
approved a consent decree reached between Israeli banks who allegedly ex-
changed information and the Israeli Antitrust Authority providing that the
entire settlement payment would be subtracted from the wrongdoers’ fine.6
The EU also allows for this possibility. For instance, the Directive (EU)
2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council states: (47)...“ NCAs
(national competition authorities) should be able to take into account any
compensation paid as a result of a consensual settlement” and in Article 14(2)
“Member States shall ensure that national competition authorities may con-
sider compensation paid as a result of a consensual settlement when deter-
mining the amount of the fine to be imposed for an infringement of Article 101
or 102 TFEU, in accordance with Article 18(3) of Directive 2014/104/EU.”7
In this paper we analyze whether rebating fines indeed stimulates pri-
vate damage actions. Furthermore, we study the effects on deterrence, in
5www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/58229.pdf
6See H′′43129-03-10 Bank Hapoalim Ltd. v. Director General of the Israeli Antitrust
Authority (15.6.2014).
7eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L& .2019.011.01.0003.01.
ENG&toc=OJ:L:2019:011:TOC. In two cases, Pre-Insulated Pipes Cartel [1999] OJ L24/1
and Nintendo [2003] OJ L255/33, the European Commission granted reductions of fines
in recognition of the fact that the wrongdoers had paid substantial compensation. The
European Commission refused to grant reductions in other cases. The EC Court of First
Instance confirmed in Archer Daniels Midland v Commission [2006] ECR II-3627 that
there is no obligation to grant such reductions. The UK offers to reduce the fine by 5-10%
should an undertaking make a voluntary redress in the processing on imposing penalty.
In Korea the competition agencies can apply a 20-30% reduction. In Turkey the fine
can be reduced at a rate of 25-60%. In Canada restitution is a factor that can be taken
into account by a court in imposing a sentence for a criminal offence. The Dutch and
Spanish competition authorities take into account voluntary compensation as a mitigating
circumstance in setting the fine. In the US the Department of Justice does not grant
rebates; there voluntary compensation is one of the conditions for obtaining leniency. See
Wils (2009), OECD (2015), and Cartel Working Group (2019).
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particular if a leniency program applies.
A firm has been fined by the antitrust authority for anti competitive
behavior. The victim seeks damages. The victim and the firm may settle
the case out-of-court. The competition authority subtracts a fraction of
the settlement payment from the wrongdoer’s fine. If they do not reach a
settlement, the victim can take the case to court.
The players’ payoffs from going to court determine their threat points in
the bargaining stage. They split the surplus created by settlement evenly. If
the plaintiff does not go to court in the last stage, his outside option whilst
bargaining is zero. The defendant will, therefore, not settle. This holds
independently of the amount that is subtracted from the defendant’s fine.
Rebating the fine thus does not stimulate settlements that would otherwise
not occur.
If the plaintiff goes to court, the parties settle without the rebate. Intro-
ducing the reduction increases the settlement amount: the rebate increases
the surplus and at the same time lowers the defendant’s marginal cost of
settling. Thus, if parties settle without the rebate, its introduction increases
the settlement amount.
Ex ante the prospect of paying the fine and the settlement potentially
deter the defendant. The rebate lowers the fine and at the same time increases
the settlement. In our set-up the first effect is stronger than the second one—
deterrence, therefore, goes down.
Then we look at a leniency applicant under a leniency program. Since
the leniency applicant is exempted from the fine, she does not care about the
rebate. The rebate reduces deterrence for non whistle blowers. It does not
affect deterrence for the leniency applicant. The relative incentive to turn
the cartel members in, therefore, goes down. Consequently, the overall effect
of a rebate on deterrence is negative.
Finally, we show that our results remain true if the agents have asym-
metric rather than symmetric information.
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Rebating fines is thus not a clever idea in our framework. It does not
stimulate settlements that would not occur absent the rebate. If parties
settle without the reduction, the rebate increases the settlement amount—
however, at the price of reduced deterrence. Moreover, the rebate makes
it less attractive for a cartel member to blow the whistle under a leniency
program.
1.1 Related Literature
We are not aware of any formal papers focusing on fine rebates. There
is a literature concerning private and public enforcement of antitrust laws.8
Shavell (1997) analyzes the divergence between the private and social motives
to sue. When a plaintiff contemplates litigating, he does neither consider
the legal costs incurred by others, nor does he recognize the positive effects
on deterrence. Shavell discusses several corrective policies, one of which is
to foster settlement over trial. McAfee et al. (2008) show that if courts are
accurate, adding private to public enforcement increases welfare; if courts are
not accurate, private enforcement increases welfare only if the government
is inefficient in litigation. Bourjade et al. (2009) study antitrust litigation
and settlement under asymmetric information. They find that increasing
damages induce more private litigation of well-founded cases than reducing
filing costs.
Buccirossi et al. (2019) analyze whether private actions for damages
may jeopardize leniency programs. The evidence provided by the leniency
applicant may be used in the damage action. Moreover, since the leniency
applicant typically does not challenge the decision of the antitrust authority,
under joint liability she may be the first one to be targeted in a private
action.9 Buccirossi et al. show that damage actions improve a leniency
8See, e.g., Segal and Whinston (2007) for a survey.
9There are, however, exceptions. In the air cargo cartel Lufthansa received full im-
munity from fines under the European Commission’s leniency program because it was
the first to provide information about the cartel (europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-10-
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program if civil liability of the immunity recipient is minimized and full
access to all evidence gathered by the competition authority is given to the
claimants.
There is a fairly large literature on settlement bargaining. It typically
finds that with symmetric information parties settle rather than file a costly
suit. To generate litigation the literature resorts to asymmetric informa-
tion. The workhorses are either screening models where the uninformed
party screens for private information using the settlement proposals (Be-
bchuck (1984) and Nalebuff (1987)), or signalling models where the informed
party signals private information with the settlement offers (Reinganum and
Wilde (1986)).10 We follow Nalebuff (1987).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes
the model. In section 3 we derive our results on settlement and deterrence
under symmetric information. In section 4 we analyze the asymmetric infor-
mation setup. The last section concludes. In Appendix 1 we show that our
symmetric information results also hold for any division of the settlement
surplus as well as for the Nash Bargaining Solution. Appendix 2 contains
the derivation of the asymmetric information scenario.
2 Model
A firm has engaged in anticompetitive behavior by, e.g., participating in
a cartel. The competition authority has, therefore, levied the firm a fine
f > 0. The victim of the infringement contemplates obtaining damages from
the wrongdoer in a civil suit.11
1487 en.htm?locale=en). Nevertheless, Lufthansa filed an appeal “based on legal consid-
erations” (bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-27/japan-airlines-appeals-48-8-million-antitrust-
fine-at-eu-court.html).
10See, e.g., Kennan and Wilson (1993) or Spier (2007) for surveys.
11We model private enforcement as an action that follows on a public enforcement deci-
sion. Private enforcement can also be a stand-alone action—a civil action brought without
any prior finding of competition law violation by an antitrust authority. In most jurisdic-
tions private enforcement is, however, mostly represented by follow-on private actions; see
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If the victim decides to go for damages, the parties first try to reach an
out-of-court settlement; the victim then gets s ≥ 0 from the wrongdoer and
drops the case. If settlement negotiations fail, the victim/plaintiff can take
the firm/defendant to court. Going to court costs each party to the conflict
c > 0. The court awards (expected) damages D > 0 to the plaintiff. Going
to court thus generates payoffs D− c for the plaintiff and −f −D− c for the
defendant.12
The payoffs from the court’s decision determine the players’ outside op-
tions/threat points in the settlement negotiations. We do not model the
bargaining process explicitly. We rather assume that the settlement amount
s is determined such that the plaintiff gets half of the surplus generated by
settlement.
The antitrust authority wants to stimulate settlement negotiations. It
will subtract the fraction λ ∈ [0, 1] of the settlement payment from the fine.
The wrongdoer will, therefore, end up with a net fine of f −λs. Let f ≥ 2D.
Then the net fine is always non-negative and we avoid tedious sub cases; we
analyze small fines in Appendix 1.13
3 Results
We solve the game by backward induction. After negotiations have failed,
the plaintiff takes the case to court if it has positive expected value, i.e., if
D − c > 0; otherwise, he drops the case, leading to a payoff of 0 for the
plaintiff and −f for the defendant.
Let us now turn to the settlement stage. If the plaintiff drops the case, by
settling the parties do not save the cost of going to court; the surplus consists
only of the subsidy λs. The plaintiff’s outside option in the bargaining pro-
OECD (2015).
12The firm made a profit and the victim suffered a loss from the anticompetitive behav-
ior. Yet, these payoffs are sunk for the problem under consideration.
13In Appendix 1 we also deal with general divisions of the surplus. Furthermore, we
derive the Nash Bargaining Solution.
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cess is 0. Furthermore, he gets his share .5λs of the surplus. Therefore, his
payoff is .5λs which he gets through the defendant’s settlement payment s.
Formally we have .5λs = s which yields s = 0. Viewed from the defendant’s
perspective: she pays s to the plaintiff and gets only her share .5λs of the
surplus thus created.
Consider now the case where the plaintiff goes to court. By settling the
parties save the cost 2c and generate the subsidy λs. The plaintiff’s outside
option is D− c. He gets his share .5(2c+λs) of the surplus. Accordingly, his
payoff is D− c+ .5(2c+ λs) which he gets through the defendant’s payment
s. This means D + .5λs = s which, in turn, yields s = D/(1− .5λ).
In the first stage, the plaintiff will go for damages if s > 0 or, equivalently,
D − c > 0; otherwise, he will not try to collect damages.
To sum up: If D − c > 0, the plaintiff goes for damages. The parties
agree on the settlement payment s = D/(1 − .5λ). Without settlement the
plaintiff would take the case to court. The plaintiff ends up with payoff s
while the defendant gets −f − (1 − λ)s. If D − c ≤ 0, the plaintiff will not
go for damages. He has payoff 0 and the defendant ends up with −f .
3.1 Settlement Stimulation
This result has several interesting implications. If D − c < 0, the plaintiff
will not litigate if asked to do so. In the negotiation stage, the threat to go to
court is not credible. The solution concept of subgame perfection/backward
induction implies that the defendant ignores empty threats and, therefore,
does not settle. This result holds for any value of the rebate λ: Even if
the full amount of the settlement can be subtracted from the fine (like in
the Israeli case mentioned in the Introduction), there will be no settlement
unless the plaintiff indeed takes the case to court. To stimulate settlement
negotiations that would otherwise not take place, subtracting the settlement
payment from the fine is ineffective. To trigger settlement bargaining, the
plaintiff has to be induced to actually take the case to court. This can, e.g.,
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be achieved by increasing D or lowering c.14
Consider now the case D > c. Here the plaintiff would take the case to
court and the parties, therefore, agree on the settlement s = D/(1 − .5λ).
The settlement amount is increasing in λ at an increasing rate.15 Thus, if
the competition authority wants larger settlement amounts, increasing the
fraction λ that can be subtracted from the fine is effective—given the parties
engage in settlement negotiations in the first place.
The fraction λ affects the settlement via two channels. First, reducing the
fine increases the surplus of not going to court, thus making the pie larger.
Second, the higher λ the lower the defendant’s marginal cost of settling: for
each unit the plaintiff obtains, the defendant effectively only pays (1 − λ).
For example, in the aforementioned Israeli case where λ = 1, each Shekel the
plaintiff got was entirely subtracted from the fine so that banks’ marginal
cost was zero.16
3.2 Deterrence
Let us now turn to deterrence. The defendant is deterred by the sum of the
fine and damages. We denote this total payment which eventually deters by
z.
If D ≤ c, s = 0 and z = f . Consider now the interesting case D > c.
Increasing λ increases the reduction in the fine, making the surplus from
settlement larger. The surplus is shared equally, implying that not only the
plaintiff but also the defendant benefits from a reduction in fine. Specifically,
z = f + (1 − λ)D/(1 − .5λ). The total payment is decreasing in λ.17 In-
14It seems difficult for the competition authority to influence D and c which are after all
in the realm of the civil court. The antitrust agency could, e.g., grant access to documents
from the antitrust case to the plaintiff, thus lowering c and increasing D.
15Formally, ∂s/∂λ = 2D/(2− λ)2 > 0 and ∂2s/∂λ2 = 4D/(2− λ)3 > 0.
16The two effects are reminiscent of the income and substitution effects in consump-
tion resulting from a price decrease. The second effect is more pronounced in the Nash
Bargaining Solution derived in the Appendix.
17Formally, ∂z/∂λ = −2D/(2− λ)2 < 0 and ∂2z/∂λ2 = −4D/(2− λ)3 < 0.
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creasing λ increases s—the marginal effect on the settlement. However, the
fraction the wrongdoer deducts goes up as well and also applies to the in-
framarginal settlement amount. The effect from reducing the inframarginal
units is stronger than the marginal effect: the total payment of a cartel mem-
ber is lower, the higher the reduction in fine λ. Consequently, deterrence is
weakened if firms anticipate the reduction in fine.
Given that the fine reduction weakens deterrence for an “ordinary” cartel
member, it is interesting to analyze the effects on a leniency applicant under
a leniency program; we use the subscript a for the applicant and no subscript
for the other cartelists.18 Suppose the leniency program grants full leniency
to the first applicant. Since the applicant’s fine is zero, it cannot be reduced
in case of a settlement.
Consider now the two cases: If D ≤ c, the plaintiff does not go to court
so that s = 0; the applicant’s total payment za = 0. If D > c, the plaintiff’s
threat to sue the applicant is credible. The total surplus from an out-of-court
settlement is 2c, there is no fine that can be reduced. The plaintiff has the
outside option D − c and gets half of the surplus 2c through the settlement
payment, i.e., D − c+ .5(2c) = s which implies za = D.
The leniency applicant’s total payment za is thus either 0 or D. It is
independent of λ. It is lower than her colleague’s total payment z which is
either f or f+(1−λ)D/(1−.5λ). Yet, for D > c the colleague’s total payment
z is decreasing in λ, so that the difference z− za also shrinks. Consequently,
the relative attractiveness of blowing the whistle (alternatively, the loss of
being the sucker) goes down with λ. This argument actually holds for any
level of liability of the leniency applicant.19 The fact that she pays no fine
18There is a fairly large literature on leniency programs; see, e.g., Motta and Polo (2003),
Spagnolo (2004), or Chen and Rey (2013). For surveys see Harrington (2017) or Marvão
and Spagnolo (2018).
19For example, in the EU Art. 11(4) of Directive 2014/104/EU provides “that an im-
munity recipient is jointly and severally liable as follows: (a) to its direct or indirect
purchasers or providers; and (b) to other injured parties only where full compensation
cannot be obtained from the other undertakings that were involved in the same infringe-
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that can be reduced drives the result.20
Whether the reduced deterrence is detrimental or not depends on the
status quo. If we start out with underdeterrence, rebating the fine may
increase underdeterrence. Suppose, by contrast, that the damage awarded
by the court reflects the harm to the public. The total payment of damage
plus fine exceeds the harm and potentially leads to overdeterrence. In this
case, rebating the fine may reduce overdeterrence.21
4 Asymmetric Information
To illustrate the effects of a fine reduction under asymmetric information, we
have to further specify the set-up, in particular the bargaining process. We
choose the framework developed by Nalebuff (1987).22 The defendant has
superior information about the damage than the plaintiff.23 Specifically, the
defendant knows the realization D of the damages. The plaintiff only knows
that damages are drawn from a probability distribution. In Appendix 2 we
consider the general case of log concave distributions; here we confine our
attention to damages being uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
Bargaining proceeds as follows: In the first stage, the uninformed plaintiff
makes a take it or leave it demand s. In the second stage, the informed
defendant either accepts or rejects the settlement demand. If she accepts,
ment of competition law.” In the US the 2004 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement
and Reform Act eliminates treble damages and joint liability for the amnesty recipient.
20Note that we do not answer the general question of whether or not damage actions
reduce the attractiveness of leniency programs. This issue is, e.g., addressed in Buccirossi
et al. (2019).
21For these argument to be valid the firms must have several different possibilities to
collude. With only one possibility, charging the monopoly price say, any sanction greater or
equal to the harm deters monopoly pricing and there is no overdeterrence. To meaningfully
talk about over- or underdeterrence, there must be more than one option to collude; see
Emons (2020). For a discussion of sub-optimal cartel fines see, e.g., Bageri et al. (2013).
22Nalebuff (1987) extends Bebchuk (1984) to possible negative value claims.
23Osborne (1999) presents some empirical evidence that defendants actually do better
in predicting court rulings than plaintiffs.
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bargaining is over. Otherwise, there is a third stage where the plaintiff either
drops the case or proceeds to court.
If the case has ex ante a negative expected value, the defendant will reject
any demand s. The plaintiff gets no new information through bargaining.
He does not update his expectation and, therefore, does not litigate. This
result corresponds to our symmetric information one and holds for any value
of λ. Rebating the fine has thus no effect on deterrence.
Let us now turn to the other possibility where the case has ex ante positive
expected value. Specifically, for our uniformly distributed damage example,
assume the cost to go to court c ≤ 1/4.
The equilibrium depends on the size of the fine. Let us sketch the outcome
for a large fine f ≥ λ(1 − c + 2λc)/(1 − λ2). The plaintiff demands s =
(1− c+ 2λc)/(1− λ2). If the defendant accepts this demand, she incurs the
cost f + (1− λ)s. If she rejects and the plaintiff takes the case to court, her
cost is f +D+ c. Defendants with D ≤ D̂ := (1−2c+λc)/(1+λ), therefore,
reject the demand; defendants with D > D̂ accept. If the plaintiff takes the
rejections to court, he expects to get D̂/2 which exceeds the litigation cost
for c ≤ 1/4. The plaintiff, therefore, indeed takes the rejected demands to
court.24 Note that the parties go to court for low D even though this is
inefficient—the typical outcome under asymmetric information; see Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983).
Let us now turn to deterrence. If D ≤ D̂, the defendant rejects, is taken to
court, and ends up paying f+D+c. This total payment is independent of λ.
If D > D̂, the defendant accepts and the total payment is z = f +(1−λ)s =
f + (1− c+ 2λc)/(1 +λ). This total payment is decreasing in λ.25 Increasing
λ increases s. Yet, the deductible fraction also goes up with the second effect
stronger than the first one. Thus, reducing the fine decreases deterrence.26
24The results for medium and small fines are as follows: For all values of f the plaintiff
goes to court. If f ∈ (λ(1 − c), λ(1 − c + 2λc)/(1 − λ2)), the plaintiff demands s = f/λ
and D̂ = f(1− λ)/λ− c. For f ≤ λ(1− c), s = 1− c and D̂ = 1− 2c− f .
25Formally, ∂z/∂λ = (3c− 1)/(1 + λ)2 < 0 for c ≤ 1/4.
26The same result holds for medium values of f . For small values of f increasing λ
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the effects of rebating fines by the redress
paid to the victims. This policy turns out to be fairly ineffective, if not coun-
terproductive, in our set-up. It does not stimulate settlements that would
otherwise not take place. If parties settle without the reduction, the rebate
indeed increases the settlement amount—however, at the cost of reduced de-
terrence. Moreover, the rebate makes it less attractive for a cartel member
to blow the whistle under a leniency program.
A few remarks are in order. Our results rely heavily on backward in-
duction arguments. If the plaintiff does not take the case to court, he has
no credible threat in the settlement negotiations. The defendant, therefore,
rejects any settlement demand in the first place, independently of the re-
bate. Backward induction/subgame perfection is probably the most widely
accepted refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. Any results which are
based on empty threats would not seem convincing to us.
For our findings on deterrence the defendant needs to rationally foresee
the fine reduction. This applies, e.g., if the rebate is a well established
policy of the antitrust authority. This was probably not the case in the
Swiss decisions. The Swiss Competition Commission granted the rebate for
the first time in 2019. It seems unlikely that the construction companies
anticipated the fine reduction when they engaged in bid rigging during the
years 2004-2012. If the rebate is an unexpected or a random event like in the
EU, it has no or little effect on deterrence.
We have focused on follow-on private actions which is the prevailing form
of private enforcement. The analysis of stand-alone private actions raises
some additional issues: Are there at all follow-on public actions with a fine
that can be reduced? Does the antitrust authority subtract only uncontested
has no effect on deterrence. Note that D̂ decreases with λ: the higher the rebate, the
fewer cases are prosecuted. This has, however, no effect on deterrence because type D̂ is
indifferent between accepting s and going to court.
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redress as in our set-up, or is contested redress also eligible? These questions
are left for future research.
Appendix 1
In this Appendix we generalize the surplus splitting under symmetric information
to any division α : (1 − α) where α ∈ (0, 1) is the plaintiff’s share. Furthermore,
we properly take into account that f − λs ≥ 0. Finally, we also derive the Nash
Bargaining Solution.
Let us first generalize the framework of the main text: rather than getting
50% of the surplus created through settlement, the plaintiff may get any share
α ∈ (0, 1).
If D−c ≤ 0, the plaintiff will not take the case to court and s = 0. If D−c > 0,
the plaintiff goes to court. His payoff is D−c+α(2c+λs) which he gets through the
settlement payment s. Accordingly, the settlement is (D− c+ 2αc)/(1−αλ) =: ŝ.
If λŝ ≥ f , the defendant cannot subtract the entire amount λŝ from her fine but
only f/λ. Settlement creates the surplus 2c+f of which the plaintiff gets his share
α. We immediately obtain D + c(2α − 1) + αf =: š which is independent of λ.
Accordingly, for D − c > 0,
s =
{
ŝ, if λŝ ≤ f ;
š, otherwise.
The unconstrained ŝ is increasing in the plaintiff’s share α as well as in λ. The
qualitative results derived in the main text continue to hold.
Let us now turn to the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) which yields a different
outcome than the bargaining process considered so far.27 In our framework s is
not only a transfer of surplus from the defendant to the plaintiff; it is also a means
to increase the size of the surplus.
Let α ∈ (0, 1) denote the bargaining power of the plaintiff and (1 − α) the
bargaining power of the defendant. The plaintiff settles if s ≥ max {0, D − c}. The
defendant can at most reduce his fine to zero, i.e., she settles if s+max{f−λs, 0} ≤
D + c+ f .
Consider first the case D ≤ c. The NBS s∗ maximizes
sα(−s−max{f − λs, 0}+ f)1−α.
27For more on the NBS see, e.g., Roth (1979). Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky
(1986) analyze the relation between the static NBS and a sequential bargaining model à
la Rubinstein (1982).
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We have s∗ = 0 which is the same outcome as in the main text. With a non-credible
threat of the plaintiff, there is no settlement payment.
Next suppose D > c; the plaintiff’s threat to sue is thus credible. If the parties
settle, the plaintiff gets s and the defendant pays s+ max{f −λs, 0}. The outside
option if bargaining fails are D−c for the plaintiff and −D−c−f for the defendant.
The NBS s∗ maximizes
(s−D + c)α(−s−max{f − λs, 0}+ f +D + c)1−α
which yields the solution
s∗ =

s̄, if f ≥ λs̄;
f/λ, if λŝ ≤ f < λs̄;
š, if f < λŝ,
where s̄ := (1− α)(D− c) + α(D + c)/(1− λ), ŝ = (D− c(1− 2α))/(1− λα), and
š = D + c(2α− 1) + αf .
If s∗ = s̄, we have qualitatively the same results as in the main text. The
settlement is increasing at an increasing rate in λ.28 The plaintiff’s bargaining
power as measured by α determines the distribution of the surplus. The gains
for the plaintiff are s̄ − (D − c) = α(2c + λ(D − c))/(1 − λ), and the gains for
the defendant are (1 − α)(2c + λ(D − c)). The plaintiff’s gains more from the
fine reduction than the defendant if λ ≥ (1 − 2α)/(1 − α). For α small, a large
λ is necessary for the plaintiff to gain more than the defendant; for α ≥ 1/2 the
plaintiff does better for any λ.
Finally, let us compare s̄ with s = D/(1 − .5λ), the settlement with equal
sharing of the surplus. The two approaches yield the same outcome for α =
(1−λ)/(2−λ). Thus, the higher λ, the less bargaining power α the plaintiff needs
to obtain equal sharing of the surplus. The higher the reduction in fine, the less
the defendant cares about the settlement amount so that the plaintiff needs less
bargaining power to appropriate half of the pie.
Appendix 2
In this Appendix we derive the equilibrium under asymmetric information sketched
in the paper for log concave distributions. The defendant knows the realization
of D while the plaintiff only knows its distribution. D is distributed on [D,D]
with density g and cdf G. The density has full support, is differentiable, and log
28s̄ is a supermodular function in α and λ, thus the effect on s̄ from increasing λ is
stronger the higher α.
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concave. Moreover, D < c, i.e., negative value cases are possible. Let D define the
defendant’s type.
In the first stage of bargaining the uninformed plaintiff makes a take it or leave
it demand s. In the second stage the informed defendant either rejects or accepts
the settlement demand. If she accepts, bargaining is over. If she rejects, there is a
third stage where the plaintiff either drops the case or proceeds to court. Denote
the probability that the plaintiff litigates by η.
If the parties settle out of court, the plaintiff gets s and the defendant pays
z := s+ max{f − λs, 0}. If the plaintiff litigates, he gets D− c and the defendant
pays D+ c+ f . The plaintiff gets zero and the defendant pays f when the case is
dropped.
For all possible values of s we will first derive Nash equilibria for the subgames
starting in stage 2. Then we will determine the plaintiff’s optimal demand s.
Consider first the defendant in stage 2. A defendant of type D ≥ D(s, η)





Next consider the plaintiff in stage 3. Since negative expected value claims
are possible, there exists a unique cut-off value D̂ where the plaintiff is indifferent





xg(x)dx = E[D|D ≤ D̂] = c.
If D < D̂, the plaintiff drops the case, thus η = 0. If D > D̂, the plaintiff litigates,
i.e., η = 1. If D = D̂, the plaintiff is indifferent, accordingly, η ∈ [0, 1]. The cut-off
D̂ is independent of s and λ.
We distinguish between the two possibilities: the case has a priori negative
or positive expected value. Let us start with the easy one where E[D] ≤ c, i.e.,
the case has negative expected value. For all possible s the defendant rejects the
demand. The plaintiff learns nothing from the defendant’s decision, sticks to his
prior, and chooses η = 0 since E[D] ≤ c. This result holds for any value of the
rebate λ. For negative expected value cases subtracting the settlement payment
from the fine is, therefore, ineffective in stimulating settlement negotiations.
Let us now turn to the interesting possibility where E[D] > c, i.e., the case has a
priori positive expected value. Suppose η = 1. Then defendants with D ≤ D(s, 1)
reject the demand. If D̂ ≤ D(s, 1), or equivalently E[D|D ≤ D(s, 1)] > c, the
plaintiff will indeed go to court. If D̂ > D(s, 1), or equivalently E[D|D ≤ D(s, 1)] <
c, the plaintiff will not go to court: a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist.
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Therefore, we construct a mixed strategy equilibrium. The plaintiff is willing to
mix in stage 3 if D(s, η) = D̂ which immediately yields η = (z − f)/(D̂ + c).
Defendants with D < D̂ reject s. Plaintiffs are indifferent whether to drop the
case or not.
We summarize these results in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: Let E[D] > c.
(i) If D̂ ≤ D(s, 1), the plaintiff litigates with η = 1 and defendants of type
D > D(s, 1) accept while the others reject;
(ii) if D̂ > D(s, 1), the plaintiff litigates with η = (z−f)/(D̂+c) and defendants
of type D > D̂ accept while the others reject.
Lemma 1 establishes for any settlement demand s an equilibrium for the en-
suing subgame. The plaintiff thus chooses s so as to maximize
(1−G(D(s)))s+G(D(s))η(s)(E[D|D ≤ D(s)]− c).
With probability (1−G(D(s))) the defendant accepts and pays s. With prob-
ability G(D(s))) the defendant rejects the demand. The plaintiff litigates with
probability η(s) which yields in expectation E[D|D ≤ D(s)] at a cost c. With
probability (1− η(s)) he drops the case and gets nothing.
Rather than solving the plaintiff’s problem directly for s, we determine the
defendant’s total payment z where s = min{(z− f)/(1− λ), z}. The plaintiff thus
picks z so as to maximize
V (z) = (1−G(q(z))) min{z − f
1− λ
, z}+G(q(z))β(z)(E[D|D ≤ q(z)]− c),
where β(z) := min{(z − f)/(D̂ + c), 1} and q(z) := (z − β(z)c− f)/β(z). V (z) is
continuous; furthermore, it is differentiable except at z = f/λ and z = D̂ + c+ f .
V (z) is strictly increasing if z ≤ D̂ + c + f : The condition implies the case
(ii) of Lemma 1, i.e., defendants of type D ≥ D̂ accept the plaintiff’s demand.
The threshold type is independent of z. Therefore, G(q(z)) does not dependent
on z while all remaining terms increase in z. Thus, the minimal payment of the
defendant to the plaintiff is D̂ + c+ f , which is independent of λ.
The equilibrium payment z is given by the following proposition:




D̂ + c+ f, if V ′1(D̂ + c+ f) < 0;
z1, if V
′
1(D̂ + c+ f) ≥ 0 > V ′1(f/λ);




where V ′1(·), V ′2(·), z1, and z2 are defined in the proof. z weakly decreases in λ.
If λ > f/(D̂ + c+ f), the defendant pays:
z =
{
D̂ + c+ f, if V ′2(D̂ + c+ f) < 0;
z2, if V
′
2(D̂ + c+ f) ≥ 0,
where V ′2(·) and z2 are defined in the proof. z is independent of λ.







+G(q(z))(E[D|D ≤ q(z)]− c)





V2(z) = (1−G(q(z)))z +G(q(z))(E[D|D ≤ q(z)]− c)
s.t. z ≥ f/λ,
(2)
with q(z) = z − c− f .
We first analyze problem (1) without constraints. The first order condition
can be written as
(1− λ)V ′1(z) = 1−G(q(z))− g(q(z))(2c(1− λ) + (z − f)λ) = 0.
Plugging the first order condition into the second order condition
(1− λ)V ′′1 (z) = −g(q(z))(1 + λ)− g′(q(z))(2c(1− λ) + (z − f)λ) < 0
and rearranging shows that the second order condition holds if
g2(·)(1 + λ) + g′(·)(1−G(·)) > 0,
which is true for g(·) log concave. Consequently, if it is interior, there exists a
unique maximum z1.
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With the implicit function theorem we derive the sign of dz1/dλ. Since V
′′
1 (z) <
0, the sign is determined by the sign of
∂2V1(z;λ)
∂z∂λ
(1− λ)2 = 1−G(q(z))− g(q(z))(z − f).
Plugging in the first order condition shows that this expression is negative if and
only if g(q(z))(1− λ)(−z + f + 2c) ≤ 0; this holds since z ≥ D̂ + c+ f ≥ 2c+ f .
We have thus shown that if the solution is interior, z1 is decreasing in λ, which
implies that deterrence is decreasing in the reduction of fine.29 Note that q(z1)
is also decreasing, which implies that more defendants will accept the settlement
demand: fewer cases will be taken to court.
Next consider problem (2). Ignoring the constraints, the first order condition
can be written as
V ′2(z) = 1−G(q(z))− g(q(z))(2c+ f) = 0.
The second order condition is
V ′′2 (z) = −g(q(z))− g′(q(z))(2c+ f) < 0
and plugging in the first order condition and manipulating shows that the condition
is equivalent to
g2(·) + g′(·)(1−G(·)) > 0,
which holds for g(·) log concave. Thus, there exists a unique maximum z2 which
is independent of λ. To have an interior solution, V ′2(f/λ) > 0.




V2(z) = (1−G(q(z)))z +G(q(z))(E[D|D ≤ q(z)]− c)
s.t. z ≥ D̂ + c+ f.
(3)
Problem (3) has the same first order condition for an interior solution as problem
(2). The solution does not depend on λ. The maximum is either z = D̂+ c+ f or,
if V ′2(D̂ + c+ f) > 0, the interior solution z2. Thus, whenever λ > f/(D̂ + c+ f),
there is no effect on the deterrence. 
z1 is decreasing in, while z2 is independent of λ. Thus, when z equals z1 or
f/λ, deterrence is decreasing in the rebate. All other payments of the defendant
do not depend on λ. Consequently, deterrence is weakly decreasing in the fine
reduction.
29The solution is interior if the following two conditions hold: V ′1(D̂ + c + f) > 0 and
V ′1(f/λ) < 0.
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